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The basic legal framework for surrogate motherhood is established 
in Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act No. 38 of 2005.[1] In Ex Parte WH,[2] 
the Pretoria High Court placed some essential flesh on the bones 
of the Children’s Act. Subsequently, some other cases have also 
contributed to the law on surrogate motherhood.[3,4] The most recent 
addition is Ex Parte KAF,[5] which was decided on 10 August 2017 by 
the Johannesburg High Court. The purpose of this article is to analyse 
the contribution made by Ex Parte KAF to the development of our law 
on surrogate motherhood. 
The growing body of case law on surrogate motherhood might 
cause one to ask whether it is fair to require commissioning parents 
and the surrogate mother to jump through so many legal hoops – 
especially considering there are no similar legal requirements for 
procreating through sexual intercourse. The case law on surrogate 
motherhood is, in theory at least, merely clarification and elaboration 
of the law within the framework created by statute. It is the Children’s 
Act in section 295 that inter alia requires: the commissioning parent(s) 
to be unable to give birth to a child and that the condition must be 
permanent and irreversible; the commissioning parent(s) to be suitable 
persons to accept parenthood of the child; and the surrogate mother 
to be a suitable person in all respects to act as a surrogate mother.[1] 
The court gradually, on a case-by-case basis as required by the facts 
of a particular matter, applies the general principles of our law to the 
requirements stipulated by the Act. Metaphorically, the Act created the 
legal hoops, and the court determines how one is to jump through 
them – or, in the case of Ex Parte KAF, how not to jump through them. 
I first discuss the facts and decision in Ex Parte KAF, and then 
analyse the potential impact of the judgment on the way in which 
clinical psychologists should prepare their reports on the suitability 
of the surrogate mother. 
Ex Parte KAF
At face value, Ex Parte KAF is a typical surrogacy confirmation 
application: the applicants were the commissioning mother and 
father (a married couple) and the surrogate mother and her life 
partner. The commissioning couple had been married since 2006, 
but were not able to have a child. The reason for this inability, 
according to the reproductive medicine specialist who provided 
an opinion in support of the surrogacy confirmation application, 
was that the commissioning mother had a uterine septum which 
had been removed twice – but each time it grew back. The 
commissioning mother underwent five IVF cycles without success. 
Subsequent to these failures, the reproductive medicine specialist 
advised the commissioning couple that surrogacy was the only 
option if they wanted a genetically related child. Through the 
surrogacy programme operated by the reproductive medicine 
specialist’s clinic, the commissioning couple were introduced to 
the surrogate mother, a 20-year-old, stay-at-home mother of two 
young children. The surrogate mother’s life partner is in full-time 
employment. All the applicants were interviewed by a clinical 
psychologist, who provided positive reports on the suitability of 
both the commissioning couple and the surrogate mother. At least 
superficially, the application appeared to be problem-free and set 
for success in court.   
Despite the apparently standard nature of the surrogacy 
application, it was dismissed for three reasons, each being sufficient: 
(i) concern about surrogacy as a means of income; (ii) concern 
about the intended surrogate mother’s psychological wellbeing; and 
(iii) concern about the impartiality of healthcare professionals. 
The first reason was that the intended surrogate mother was likely 
to use surrogacy as a means of income. According to the proposed 
surrogate motherhood agreement, the commissioning parents would 
reimburse the intended surrogate mother for pregnancy-related 
expenses up to ZAR4 000 per month – increasing to up to ZAR6 000 
per month after she falls pregnant. Although the proposed surrogate 
motherhood agreement provided examples of pregnancy-related 
expenses, these examples were not exhaustive and there was no 
budgetary limit on any specific item. (Ex Parte WH at paragraph 29 had 
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already laid down the requirement that ‘a detailed list of surrogacy 
expenses with sufficient specificity should be provided’).[2] Furthermore, 
the court expressed concern about the surrogate mother’s financial 
position: the intended surrogate mother lived with her life partner and 
his extended family on a smallholding; no facts were placed before the 
court regarding any of these people’s income. However, the municipal 
account for the smallholding, which was attached to serve as proof of 
the surrogate mother’s residence, revealed that about ZAR15 000 was 
outstanding. Based on these facts, the court decided that there was 
a risk that the intended surrogate mother was using surrogacy as a 
means of income. 
The court’s second reason for dismissing the application was 
concern about the intended surrogate mother’s psychological 
wellbeing – in spite of the psychological report that declared the 
intended surrogate mother suitable to become a surrogate mother. 
The court highlighted the following facts from the commissioning 
mother’s founding affidavit: the intended surrogate mother, ND, 
fell pregnant with her first child at the age of 16, and subsequently 
dropped out of school. There were no facts before the court that 
ND has since made any attempt to finish school or to gain any 
type of vocational training. Given these facts, the court rejected 
the psychologist’s conclusion that ND is suitable to be a surrogate 
mother, as being unsupported by the facts. Does ND have the 
maturity to appreciate that she will have to hand over the child to 
the commissioning parents after birth? The court was not convinced 
of this, and held that it was not satisfied that ND has the maturity to 
appreciate the implications of her life decisions. 
The third reason for dismissing the application is especially 
relevant to healthcare professionals involved in surrogacy. In this 
case, the reproductive medicine specialist who provided the court 
with his opinion on the commissioning mother’s infertility, and the 
psychologist who provided opinions on the applicants, both seem 
to be associated with the same fertility clinic. This fertility clinic 
would also have been contracted to provide in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) treatment for the surrogate mother, had the application been 
successful. Given these facts, the court expressed two related 
concerns: firstly, about the objectivity of the relevant healthcare 
professionals, and secondly about the possible commercialisation 
of surrogacy. The court held that it had insufficient information 
about the exact financial arrangements between the relevant 
healthcare professionals and the clinic to make final findings on 
these concerns.
Analysis 
The court in Ex Parte KAF held that, on the facts before it, it 
was unpersuaded about the suitability of the surrogate mother. 
However, the court did not elaborate on what information or kinds 
of information would have persuaded it otherwise. In other words, 
even if a clinical psychologist explores every aspect of a candidate 
surrogate mother’s life in detail, and metaphorically looks under 
every stone, how does the psychologist decide whether a candidate 
is a suitable surrogate mother? Accordingly, the underlying problem 
in our law that was exposed in Ex Parte KAF is the lack of objective 
criteria for evaluating the suitability of a surrogate mother. I suggest 
that clinical psychologists who evaluate candidate surrogate mothers 
should give urgent and careful thought to identifying such objective 
criteria, and start explicitly articulating such criteria in the reports 
that they file in surrogate motherhood agreement confirmation 
applications. In fact, experts in general have a duty to furnish the 
court with the criteria that they used to reach their conclusions, so 
as to enable the court to form its own independent judgment by 
application of the criteria to the facts.[6] Moreover, this practice would 
give the court the opportunity to engage with such criteria and to 
develop precedents in this regard. Absent clear, objective criteria, 
different psychologists and different judges will all be working with 
their own tacit, subjective criteria. This is clearly not in the interests 
of justice. 
The Ex Parte KAF judgment emphasised the general legal 
requirement that experts must be objective in fact and in perception. 
But what exactly is meant by objectivity in our law? Can objectivity be 
reconciled with personal interests? The reality is that no expert – or 
even a judge – is ever completely free from personal interests. As the 
Constitutional Court held in paragraph 14 of its judgment in South 
African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Irvin & Johnson 
(footnotes omitted):[7]
 ‘“Absolute neutrality” is something of a chimera in the judicial 
context. This is because judges are human. They are unavoidably 
the product of their own life experiences, and the perspective 
thus derived inevitably and distinctively informs each judge’s 
performance of his or her judicial duties.’
The same is true of experts. The key to objectivity is not to have no 
personal interests – which is impossible – but rather to deliberately 
act free of such interests. The Missouri Court of Appeals succinctly 
articulated this principle, as it relates to expert opinions, as follows:[8] 
 ‘“Objectivity” is the quality of being free from the influence of 
personal considerations in the exercise of professional skills and 
professional judgment.’
In the context of psychological reports on the suitability of surrogate 
mothers, the key to acting in an independent, objective way – and 
being perceived to act as such – is to implement the objective-criteria 
approach that I suggested above: a clinical psychologist should 
explicitly state the criteria used for evaluating the suitability of a 
surrogate mother, and should explain how these criteria are applied 
to the facts. In this way, a clinical psychologist will demonstrate that 
he or she does not merely provide a subjective opinion on suitability, 
but deliberately acts objectively. 
Conclusion
Our legal system is dynamic and continuously developing – especially 
through case law. Ex Parte KAF applied some of the general principles 
of our law of evidence to surrogacy confirmation applications. The 
result is that a problematic lacuna in our law regarding surrogate 
motherhood has surfaced. To a large extent, applicants in surrogate 
motherhood agreement confirmation applications have been 
trying to jump through the suitable-surrogate-mother legal hoop 
in the dark. The way to illuminate this legal hoop is through the 
development of objective criteria. 
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